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RACE LIBERALISM AND THE DERADICALIZATION 
 OF RACIAL REFORM 
Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw 
In the era that followed the formal collapse of white supremacy, ef-
forts to sustain and broaden reformist agendas against the denouement 
of social justice movements exposed a series of discordant debates on 
the Left.  While many such conflicts surfaced throughout the social or-
der, some of these debates were staged in elite spaces like Harvard Law 
School.  The Harvard Law School boycott of 1982 reflected a rupture 
among race-reform advocates between what I call “race liberalism,” an 
ideology that ultimately embodies a “colorblind” model of racial justice 
that seeks to eliminate “discrimination,” and a “critical race” discourse 
focused on the distribution of racial power, a perspective requiring the 
very race consciousness that race liberals saw as the evil that reform 
aimed to transcend.  In the 1980s, the rhetorical battles between these 
two camps played out in a number of contexts, including, for example, 
debates about race-conscious affirmative action policies in elite  
institutions. 
The temporal and institutional setting of the battles exposed how 
knowledge production in legal education was an arena of racial contes-
tation not unlike the lunch counters and ballot boxes that confronted 
civil rights advocates in the decades before.  When students of color 
demanded a say in how race and law would be conceptualized as a field 
of inquiry, they challenged the deepest pretense of liberal sensibility — 
that universities themselves are apolitical arbiters of neutral knowledge 
rather than participants in the struggle over how social power is  
exercised. 
Harvard Law School was a generative site of struggle over the norms 
and content of elite legal education, particularly in shaping the contours 
of liberal-radical conflict about law and social transformation.  The lib-
eral project of enhancing social mobility and democratic participation 
through rationality and rights was a foundational commitment of the 
Civil Rights Establishment (CRE)1.  The legal face of race liberalism 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
  Professor of Law, Columbia Law School and University of California, Los Angeles, School of 
Law.  I am grateful to the many colleagues who read multiple versions of this Article and to partic-
ipants at the Social Justice Writers Retreat: Mary Frances Berry, Gary Peller, Duncan Kennedy, 
Devon Carbado, Luke Harris, and Chris Lehmann. Research assistance was provided by Cynthia 
Luo, Elena Rodriguez, Marcus Tippens, and Teddy Fenster.  Special thanks goes to Michael Kramer 
who went far beyond the call of duty.  
 1 When referring to the CRE, I mean to include organizations and civil rights leaders who 
embraced an integrationist ideal, that is, a commitment to staying the course of civil rights reform 
by bringing social practices throughout American society into alignment with the nation’s ideals.  
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included not only the network of faculty, administrators, judges, and 
graduates who moved in concert with this commitment, but also the 
lingua franca of liberal institutions. 
Harvard was also a central location in the map of radical thinking 
about law.  Key figures in the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement 
were prominent members of the law school’s faculty.2  During its heyday 
at Harvard, CLS’s critiques of law and its relation to social hierarchy 
coincided with a period of heightened student activism related to faculty 
hiring, curricular development, and the interface between legal liberal-
ism and Critical Race Theory.  The influence of these communities of 
thought in shaping an alternative view of racial power was not a simple 
matter of students’ selective incorporation of legal liberalism and CLS.  
Instead, the unfolding conflict became an interpretive template from 
which to map the ideological investments of a race project that wasn’t 
critical, utilizing the critical tools of a radical project that was only be-
ginning to interrogate race.  The battle over affirmative action at  
Harvard became a social text that galvanized student critics into artic-
ulating an alternative view of racial power, one in which notions of merit 
and institutional settlement were seen as mere rationalizations for the 
refusal to interrogate or interrupt the core commitments of elite legal  
education.3  
These dynamics unfolded into projects that integrated insights about 
the relationship between knowledge and racial power that had surfaced 
in other sites across the university into critical discourses about law.  
Critical Race Theory and intersectional feminism/antiracism emerged 
from this interface as a product of ideological tension between race lib-
erals and their left-leaning critics.4  It took shape within the simulta-
neous encounters between faculty and students who were struggling to 
articulate how radical thinking about law and about race could cross-
pollinate and find expression as an intellectual and political project. 
Part I of this Essay explores liberal responses to the social disruptions 
that shook the country in the 1960s and 1970s, which reflected a belief 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
The legal arm of the CRE included organizations, judges, and other notables whose prestige was 
built on their ability to wrest important victories from the courts, wielding the law as both sword 
and shield in the fight against racial injustice. 
 2 Some of the Harvard faculty who were among the key figures in the CLS movement at the 
time were Duncan Kennedy, Roberto Unger, Morton Horwitz, Clare Dalton, David Trubek, and 
Daniel Tarullo.  See Jennifer A. Kingston, Harvard Tenure Battle Puts “Critical Legal Studies” on 
Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/08/30/weekinreview/harvard- 
tenure-battle-puts-critical-legal-studies-on-trial.html [https://perma.cc/6H6P-7ZRU]; Calvin Trillin, 
Harvard Law, NEW YORKER, Mar. 26, 1984, at 56. 
 3 See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking Back to 
Move Forward, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1253, 1275 (2011); Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE 
L.J. 758, 764–65, 772–73, 777. 
 4 See generally Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, 
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991). 
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that law could facilitate orderly and meaningful reform.  For race liber-
als in particular, the integration of bodies that had been historically  
underrepresented throughout the nation’s elite institutions was a central 
pillar of post-segregation society.  As discussed in Part II, while this re-
sponse translated into the integration of nonwhite faculty into the elite 
ranks of legal education, the most committed race liberals maintained 
their faith in the ideals of a colorblind meritocracy.  Although race lib-
erals would occasionally support race-conscious departures from the 
colorblind norm for select integrative purposes, their idealization of 
merit as colorblind and “race neutral” set the stage for a nationally pub-
licized eruption over faculty hiring and curricular development.  One 
site of this conflict was the controversy over the Alternative Course at 
Harvard Law School.5 
I.  TENSIONS OF THE 1960s AND 1970s 
Although integration and its counterpoints — discrimination and 
bias — are now ubiquitous as the dominant ways of thinking about 
racial power, they were not always the undisputed center of gravity.  
Knowledge production about race and social power has always been a 
contested enterprise in which the very same dynamics that were under 
study were playing out among those involved in the field.  Racialized 
dynamics of power and prestige contribute to how the center and mar-
gins of racial thinking are constructed.  In fact, scholars of the early 
twentieth century such as Oliver Cox and W.E.B. Du Bois theorized 
racial power differently than those whose frameworks are now im-
printed in the public consciousness.6  Along with other Black scholars, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 5 See Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1806–
07 (1989) (characterizing race consciousness as a “deviant mode” of academic evaluation that should 
not be naturalized into “our conception of meritocracy,” id. at 1807).  But see generally Duncan 
Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DUKE L.J. 705 
(labeling Randall Kennedy’s position “colorblind meritocratic fundamentalism,” id. at 707, and pro-
posing an argument against “a sharp boundary between meritocratic decision and race-based deci-
sion,” id. at 711). 
 6 Cox, for instance, “exposed the whiteness of sociology” with classic critiques of sociologists 
Robert Park and Gunnar Myrdal.  See Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1257 & n.9 (citing OLIVER 
CROMWELL COX, CASTE, CLASS & RACE: A STUDY IN SOCIAL DYNAMICS 462–77 (1948)); see 
also W.E. Burghardt Du Bois, Does the Negro Need Separate Schools?, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 328, 
328 (1935) (arguing that the quality of education matters more than whether schools are separate 
or integrated).  See generally W.E.B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA (1935); 
ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION (1988).  For accounts of the paradigm-shifting work done by 
scholars in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1301 n.157 (citing 
James Turner & C. Steven McGann, Black Studies as an Integral Tradition in African-American 
Intellectual History, 49 J. NEGRO EDUC. 52 (1980)); and James E. Turner, Foreword: Africana 
Studies and Epistemology: A Discourse in the Sociology of Knowledge, in THE NEXT DECADE: 
THEORETICAL AND RESEARCH ISSUES IN AFRICANA STUDIES, at v, vii–viii (James E. Turner 
ed., 1984)). 
  
2017] RACE LIBERALISM AND RACIAL REFORM 2301 
they foregrounded a conception of racism in terms of socioeconomic 
power between Black and white communities rather than as interper-
sonal interactions distorted by prejudice. 
Although Du Bois, Cox, and others presented compelling research 
conceptualizing racial power beyond the “race relations” models that in-
formed mid-twentieth century conceptions of race liberalism, their pro-
jects were subject to disciplinary and institutional containment by pow-
erful white scholars.  Melville Herskovits and Robert E. Parks, each of 
whom sat atop academic fields pertaining to African Americans, 
guarded their projects against thinkers that they considered to be polit-
ically self-interested rather than academically neutral.  For example, Du 
Bois, regarded now as an influential pioneer of multiple disciplines in-
cluding sociology, Black studies, and international relations — was la-
beled by Herskovits as an advocate who eschewed “objectivity” in mat-
ters pertaining to the inferiority of Black people.7 
Foundations also played a significant role in shrinking the real estate 
that might have otherwise grounded a research and advocacy agenda 
beyond the “race relations” frame.8  Du Bois, despite his unparalleled 
expertise, was never entrusted to produce a project on the scale of  
Gunnar Myrdal’s An American Dilemma.9  The framing of American 
racial hierarchy by Myrdal as a “dilemma” has shaped thinking about 
race and reform for over half a century.  In this context, the power to 
punish and reward scholars based on their ideological convergence with 
white power brokers is one of the many ways that contemporary think-
ing about racial power has been shaped by prominent whites within the 
academy and civil society.10 
White power brokers, however, were not the only forces that sought 
to corral antiracist thinking into narrow parameters.  Like academia, 
the Civil Rights Establishment also observed performative norms that 
reflected shared beliefs in the functional legitimacy of mainstream insti-
tutions, particularly legal ones.  Key among these was the Supreme 
Court, a respected institution duly regarded by many civil rights advo-
cates as a friend to African Americans.  Yet a particularly consequential 
conflict implicating the tensions between centrist integrationism and a 
more power-based antiracism was the 1969 publication of an article in 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 7 JERRY GERSHENHORN, MELVILLE J. HERSKOVITS AND THE RACIAL POLITICS OF 
KNOWLEDGE 9–10 (2004) (describing the manner in which Herskovits dismissed Black scholars 
as “propagandists rather than scientists,” thus failing to acknowledge that scholarship is inherently 
political and limiting the impact of his own legacy); Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1302 n.158. 
 8 LEAH A. GORDON, FROM POWER TO PREJUDICE 72–77 (2015). 
 9 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN 
DEMOCRACY (1944). 
 10 See STEPHEN STEINBERG, RACE RELATIONS: A CRITIQUE 75–76 (2007) (describing 
Marxism as a “convenient scapegoat for . . . racial violence,” id. at 75, and noting that Marxist 
Black scholars had to be careful to avoid backlash from white philanthropists or anti-Marxists). 
  
2302 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 130:2298 
the New York Times Magazine by civil rights lawyer Lewis Steel.  The 
article led to Steel’s termination and the resignation of much of the legal 
staff of the NAACP. 
Entitled “A Critic’s View of the Warren Court — Nine Men in Black 
Who Think White,” Steel’s essay challenged the celebratory view of the 
Court as a liberationist institution, criticizing the Court’s limited reme-
dial remedies for the injuries of segregation.11  Steel wrote: 
[T]he Court chose to act in the manner of the practical political reformer.  
Rather than ordering sweeping desegregation, it ordered another hearing.  
A year later, the Court ruled that the South did not have to desegregate its 
schools immediately, it merely had to do so ‘with all deliberate speed.’ . . . 
The Court thereby made clear that it was a white court which would protect 
the interests of white America in the maintenance of stable institutions.  In 
essence, the Court considered the potential damage to white Americans re-
sulting from the diminution of privilege as more critical than continued 
damage to the underprivileged.12 
With neither notice nor an investigation, the NAACP Board fired 
Steel for writing the article.13  The decision was subsequently ratified 
by the NAACP’s Executive Director Roy Wilkins as a legitimate re-
sponse to the article’s implicit denigration of the organization and the 
Supreme Court.14  Yet Robert Carter, the general counsel of the 
NAACP — and widely regarded as Thurgood Marshall’s Lieutenant 
General in the battle over American Apartheid — found nothing dis-
qualifying in the article and intimated that Steel’s arguments comported 
with his own views.  Carter denounced the Board’s actions as antithet-
ical to the purpose of the NAACP’s legal advocacy agenda,15 contending 
that the goal of civil rights attorneys “was to break new ground and to 
develop new concepts of law that could be used in the struggle for free-
dom.”16  Pointedly, Carter stated: “Our aim had always been to fight the 
status quo, not to join it . . . .”17  Yet in the eyes of the NAACP Board, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 11 See Lewis Steel, A Critic’s View of the Warren Court — Nine Men in Black Who Think White, 
N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 13, 1968, at 56 [hereinafter Steel, A Critic’s View].  Steel wrote the article 
after continually seeing what he called “classic white man’s justice” and being tormented by the 
indifference of judges and overwhelmed by feelings stemming from the ineffectiveness of the courts 
to make meaningful reform in a short time.  See LEWIS M. STEEL WITH BEAU FRIEDLANDER, 
THE BUTLER’S CHILD: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 151–53 (2016). 
 12 Steel, A Critic’s View, supra note 11, at 112. 
 13 See STEEL, supra note 11, at 155–57.  
 14 Letter from Roy Wilkins, NAACP Exec. Dir., to Members of the NAACP Board of Directors 
(Nov. 12, 1968). 
 15 See ROBERT L. CARTER, A MATTER OF LAW: A MEMOIR OF STRUGGLE IN THE CAUSE 
OF EQUAL RIGHTS 201–02 (2005) (describing Steel’s argument to be that “the Court had struck 
down the symbols of racism while condoning or overlooking the ingrained practices that had meant 
the survival of white supremacy”).  Yet this argument is neither radical nor unique.  Speculation in 
this regard has been a consistent theme in legal and historical literature about Brown and its legacy. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 202. 
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Steel had crossed the line of respectability — his analysis expressed con-
tempt both toward institutions like the NAACP, which had marshaled 
the reform project, and toward the Supreme Court, which had become 
a trusted ally in the struggle against racial oppression.18  Carter stood 
by Steel and demanded his reinstatement.19  The Board’s refusal 
prompted Carter and “the entire general counsel’s office” of the NAACP 
to  
resign.20 
This matter became a red-hot controversy within the wider civil 
rights community as lawyers and NAACP members from across the 
country weighed in.21  Many were appalled that the NAACP would take 
such summary action against a respected and highly valued lawyer 
simply because he publicly chastised the high court on points with which 
many within the CRE agreed.22  Wilkins and others, however, argued 
to the contrary.23  Jack Greenberg,24 in a letter written to the New York 
Times, penned an institutional defense of the Supreme Court, pointing 
out that “[t]he judiciary simply does not have the power to right all the 
wrongs which need correction.”25 
While Greenberg’s point did not quite meet Steel’s argument that 
the Court had not fully exercised the power it did have, his letter at least 
implicitly acknowledged that there was a “tolerated residuum” of white 
supremacy.26  The Steel case displayed the deep conflict within the CRE 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 18 See Steel, A Critic’s View, supra note 11, at 112. 
 19 See CARTER, supra note 15, at 200–02. 
 20 Id. at 202. 
 21 See id. at 200–02. 
 22 See id.  Among the civil rights advocates who expressed their dismay at the firing of Steel 
were a leading group of legal scholars at Howard University who said they “believe[d] that the 
N.A.A.C.P. ha[d] acted in a manner inconsistent with fundamental fairness” and “that [its] action 
[was] at war with the legal positions which the Association ha[d] taken in various cases before the 
United States Supreme Court.”  Letter from Herbert O. Reid et al., Howard Univ. Professors, to 
NAACP Board of Directors (Oct. 15, 1968), microformed on Papers of the NAACP, Pt. 16, Reel 2 
(Univ. Pub’ns of Am.). 
 23 See Letter from Roy Wilkins to NAACP National Board Members (Oct. 24, 1968) micro-
formed on Papers of the NAACP, Pt. 16, Reel 1 (Univ. Pub’ns of Am.) (restating the board’s concern 
that the “average reader” would conclude, from the identification of Steel “as associate general 
counsel of the NAACP,” “that the NAACP joined officially in his criticism”).  Wilkins wrote that 
Steel’s article “in effect, declared that the entire NAACP and the Negro general public had been 
deluded these many decades if it regarded previous successes as being anything more solid than 
vapor.”  Id. 
 24 Jack Greenberg was the second director-counsel of the LDF and tried forty cases before the 
Supreme Court during his legal career, including Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 
and Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971).  Jack Greenberg, NAACP LDF, http://www. 
naacpldf.org/jack-greenberg-biography [https://perma.cc/J3CP-N6TC]. 
 25 Letter from Jack Greenberg, NAACP Dir.-Counsel, to the Editor of the New York Times 
(Oct. 17, 1968), microformed on Papers of the NAACP, Pt. 16, Reel 2 (Univ. Pub’ns of Am.). 
 26 Cf. Duncan Kennedy, Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing and the Eroticization of Domination, 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 1309, 1320 (1992) (arguing that “some abuse, what I will call the ‘tolerated 
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about how to think about and engage racial power outside the author-
ized parameters set by Supreme Court discourse.  It also reveals that 
one of the ways the Harvard boycott would be framed — as mortal 
combat between respectable integrationist lawyers on one hand and hot-
headed activists on the other — actually reflected tensions that were 
entrenched within the CRE itself.27 
II.  THE IDEOLOGICAL SPLIT WITHIN THE RADICAL WING 
A.  Historicizing Conflict Between Race Liberals and Race Crits 
In the wider culture beyond the CRE, critiques of the terms of inte-
gration — particularly critiques that challenged the status quo by fore-
grounding questions of power — raised the specter of Black Power.  Al-
though the call for Black Power was voiced by activists who were 
diverse in their demands and tactics, legal liberals and the wider CRE 
often received it as a call for violence and separatism.  Promoted by a 
younger generation of fiery orators like Stokely Carmichael,28 and later 
by Black Panthers such as Huey Newton29 and Black Muslims such as 
Malcolm X, Black Power was denounced by some of the conventional 
civil rights leaders as a dangerous and racist infatuation of reckless 
youth.  But this was both more than a generational split and less than 
the separatist split that it was often portrayed to be.  Within the nar-
rower confines of the civil rights community and the university, the dis-
course around power illuminated ways of thinking about racial prob-
lems that transcended the contemporary emphasis on eliminating 
prejudice.  The effort to think about racial power beyond prejudice was 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
residuum,’ is plausibly attributed to contestable social decisions about what abuse is and how im-
portant it is to prevent it”). 
 27 Another conflict that caused a major split involved Angela Davis, a Black activist whose 
highly publicized trial for kidnapping and murder was widely regarded by young Black activists as 
an effort to dismantle the Black liberation struggle.  See JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE 
COURTS 405 (1994).  Although the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) staff voted almost unani-
mously to represent Davis, Greenberg overruled the vote.  See id. at 404–05.  He later argued that 
while the staff “wanted to be seen as allies of the Black Panthers, students who tore campuses apart 
and paraded with rifles, draft resisters, and prisoners who fought jailers,” these activities would 
lead to self-destruction.  Id. at 405.  The LDF Board agreed.  Id. 
 28 Stokely Carmichael, later known as Kwame Ture, took over the leadership of the Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee after ousting John Lewis in what has been framed as a shift 
from nonviolence and intergrationism to self-defense and separatism.  See generally Michael T. 
Kaufman, Stokely Carmichael, Rights Leader Who Coined “Black Power,” Dies at 57, N.Y.  
TIMES (Nov. 16, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/16/us/stokely-carmichael-rights-leader-
who-coined-black-power-dies-at-57.html [https://perma.cc/93GG-J3TY]. 
 29 Huey P. Newton attended Merritt College where he organized the Black Panther Party for 
Self Defense with Bobby Seale to protect their community members while taking a more militant 
stance toward the plight of Black communities.  Mark A. Stein, Even in Death, Newton Stirs 
Sparks: Family, Friends Bitter at Those Who Label Him a Criminal, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 24, 1989), 
http://articles.latimes.com/1989-08-24/news/mn-1357_1_huey-newton [https://perma.cc/7P8V-YRR7]. 
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not new.  The deeper ideological differences between, on one hand, those 
who ascribed to the centrist integrationist project, and, on the other, 
those like Derrick Bell, who were sympathetic to Black Power, echoed 
tensions that surfaced between scholars, lawyers, and activists through-
out the twentieth century. 
While the goals of the traditionalist wing of the CRE were expressed 
as integration through the removal of bias, the demand of the radical 
wing was for power, variously described as power to participate as a 
people in American society on equal terms, power to determine destinies, 
power to remake institutions that had been structured on the basis of 
racial exclusion, and power to choose whether to participate in reformed 
institutions or to build new ones.30  There were numerous perspectives 
and conflicts even among those who identified with the power agenda.  
But, in its emphasis on deepening reformist sensibilities to interrogate 
“neutral” or so-called “objective” practices in the production of 
knowledge and legal rules, it set terms that would eventually shape the 
course of Critical Race Theory.31 
The site of the university — and later, the law school — as a field of 
racial struggle has often been overlooked in favor of more direct symbols 
of racial power, such as polling places or lunch counters in the South.  
But, for both traditionalists and more radical advocates, perspectives on 
the events leading up to the Alternative Course would foreshadow dif-
fering views about how access to higher education figured into the 
broader project of dismantling white supremacy.  For the traditionalists, 
access to higher education was crucial to developing a stable Black mid-
dle class.32  While the educational roadways to middle-class status for 
white Americans had been paved by the GI Bill and access to other 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 30 See Gary Peller, History, Identity, and Alienation, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1479, 1484–85 (2011) 
(comparing integrationism, which for “many African Americans . . . signified cultural assimilation 
rather than liberal neutrality,” id. at 1484, with Black nationalism, which “involves the centering 
of race consciousness to identify a Black community, based on the idea that race constitutes African 
Americans as a distinct social group,” id. at 1485); see also Ibram Rogers, Celebrating 40 Years of 
Activism, DIVERSE EDUC. (June 28, 2006), h t t p : / / d i v e r s e e d u c a t i o n . c o m / a r t i c l e / 6 0 5 3 / [h t t p s : / / 
 p e r m a . c c / E 3 C 5 - Z H H 3].  
 31 Cf. Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1309–10. 
 32 See Donald K. Hill, Law School, Legal Education, and the Black Law Student, 12 T. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 457, 489–93 (1987) (discussing the need for Black students to move from an oral 
tradition to a reading tradition to help them advance and succeed in different levels of higher edu-
cation); see also Kenneth L. Karst, Citizenship, Race, and Marginality, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1, 8–9 (1988) (explaining how “considerable increases in the numbers of black officeholders, black 
professionals, and black students,” id. at 8, during the 1980s led to flourishing of the Black middle 
class). 
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governmental supports, Black access to higher education and profes-
sionalism had been undermined by rules that facilitated segregation in 
institutions of higher education and other training programs.33 
Access was also among the core concerns for the newer activists who 
protested at San Francisco State and elsewhere to demand universal 
access to higher education.34  But activists who foregrounded the lack 
of power rather than the presence of bias as the touchstone of racial 
injustice marched under a wider indictment of universities as sites of 
knowledge production that legitimated white supremacy and colonized 
subordinated people.35 
For these critics, substantive integration involved a broadening of 
the curriculum and the creation of programs and departments that set 
as their objectives the development of expertise in relationship to the 
needs of colonized communities.36  They too sought to eliminate a cer-
tain sense of “bias” in the educational arena.  But in their thinking this 
project involved interrogating how knowledge-producing industries jus-
tify and rationalize widespread inequality.37  In this frame universities 
were arenas of struggle in the same way that voting booths were.  They 
were sites where racial power was created, aggregated, and mobilized 
in ways that legitimized racially inequitable ends.  And like polling 
booths and lunch counters, universities were the sites of widespread or-
ganizing by Black students during this era.  Indeed, during the upswing 
of student activism in the 1960s, Black Student Unions were established 
in every state in the union, and conflicts between students and admin-
istrators were fierce and sometimes bloody.38 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 33 See Anthony M. Platt, The Rise and Fall of Affirmative Action, 11 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETH-
ICS & PUB. POL’Y 67, 69 (1997) (“A . . . double-standard of racist and sexist practices for veterans 
was imposed after World War II when the 1944 GI Bill enabled some 7.8 million, mostly white, 
male veterans to afford higher education with the help of free tuition and supplies, a living subsidy 
(including additional payments for children), and low-interest loans for housing. . . . The few thou-
sand African Americans who used the GI Bill to go to college were mostly tracked into segregated, 
inferior colleges.”). 
 34 See generally AGENTS OF CHANGE (Frank Dawson & Abby Ginzberg 2016) (documentary 
examining college campus protests of the late 1960s). 
 35 See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1755; cf. STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES 
V. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER 30–32 (1967) (describing the detrimental effect of “adaptation,” id. 
at 30, on the Black community). 
 36 See Randall Kennedy, supra note 5, at 1755 (“In the 1970’s, activists associated with the Black 
Power Movement expressed . . . demands concerning academia . . . .  Among the demands were 
that evaluative criteria designed by and for blacks supplement or replace ‘white standards,’ that 
‘black studies’ be accorded recognition as a distinct area of scholarly endeavor, and that black 
studies be taught and governed exclusively or predominantly by black professors and students.”). 
 37 Id. at 1754–60 (discussing the cultural context of racial critiques and the need to examine the 
relationship between knowledge and power). 
 38 See, e.g., George Lowery, A Campus Takeover That Symbolized an Era of Change, CORNELL 
CHRON. (Apr. 16, 2009), h t t p : / / w w w . n e w s . c o r n e l l . e d u / s t o r i e s / 2 0 0 9 / 0 4 / c a m p u s - t a k e o v e r - s y m b o l i z e d - 
e r a - c h a n g e  [ h t t p s : / / p e r m a . c c / B X 5 M - R Q Y 5 ]. 
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B.  Student Activism and Derrick Bell 
These divisions were, by the 1980s, well rehearsed both within the 
CRE and between the CRE and student movements.  Protests and agi-
tation for greater university access and curricular reform had spread 
across the country in the late 1960s, and the reverberations were still felt 
in universities and colleges long after the sharpest conflicts had receded 
into history.39  These issues, however, were fairly distant from the im-
mediate concerns of law school administrators in the 1980s.  Efforts to 
bring greater diversity into law schools were mainly achieved through 
student recruitment.40  Harvard was one of the most aggressively com-
mitted law schools when it came to matriculating nontraditional stu-
dents from both the United States and the wider international commu-
nity.41  With a “diversity” agenda managed largely by opening a pipeline 
of students to pass through the institution, the specter of open racial 
conflict at Harvard Law School was perhaps far from the center of the 
school’s concerns as the post–civil rights generation made their way to 
Cambridge.  Antiwar politics that had disrupted the law school were 
distant memories by the 1980s, and the most significant political tensions 
were associated with young white male leftists, who by 1983 were as-
serting an intellectual and political agenda that challenged some of the 
basic premises of mainstream legal education. 
As Professor Christopher Edley Jr. noted in a contemporaneous ac-
count of the events that erupted over race at Harvard, the seeds of the 
controversy were planted when Derrick Bell left the school after teach-
ing there for eleven years.42  A former civil rights lawyer who had 
worked with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) and for the De-
partment of Justice, Bell was recruited and hired by Harvard, becoming 
its first Black law professor in 1969.43  As Bell would later say of his 
hiring, his were not the formal credentials of a typical professor at  
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 39 See Ronald Walters & Robert Smith, The Black Education Strategy in the 1970s, 48 J. NE-
GRO EDUC. 156, 157 (1979) (noting that “[t]he protest demands of black students [in 1969] were 
generally reformist, specific and programmatic in character,” and describing “more black courses,” 
an “increase [in] black student enrollment,” and “more black faculty” as among the most frequently 
demanded changes). 
 40 See, e.g., Luz E. Herrera, Challenging a Tradition of Exclusion: The History of an Unheard 
Story at Harvard Law School, 5 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 51, 53 n.10 (2002) (describing recruiting 
efforts directed at minority students by Harvard Law School). 
 41 See id. at 53 & n.9. 
 42 See Christopher Edley, Jr., The Boycott at Harvard: Should Teaching Be Colorblind?, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 18, 1982, at A23. 
 43 See Derrick Bell, Jr., A Question of Credentials [hereinafter Bell, Credentials], in BLACKS AT 
HARVARD: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN EXPERIENCE AT  
HARVARD AND RADCLIFFE 467, 471 (Werner Sollors et al. eds., 1993); Fred A. Bernstein, Derrick 
Bell, Pioneering Law Professor and Civil Rights Advocate, Dies at 80, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2011), 
h t t p : / / w w w . n y t i m e s . c o m / 2 0 1 1 / 1 0 / 0 6 / u s / d e r r i c k - b e l l - p i o n e e r i n g - h a r v a r d - l a w - p r o f e s s o r - d i e s - a t - 
8 0 . h t m l [https://perma.cc/JVW3-LDGM]. 
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Harvard, where a degree from a fancy law school, membership on the 
law review, and a prestigious clerkship were de rigueur.44  Bell’s creden-
tials were developed in another universe populated by a community of 
civil rights lawyers who strategized and fought for what has since been 
called a legal revolution.  Most of the legal eagles of the civil rights 
generation were developed in laboratories far removed from elite white 
schools in the nation.  Legal stars like Thurgood Marshall45 and Robert 
Carter46 had executed Charles Hamilton Houston’s47 long-term cam-
paign to upend segregation from headquarters at Howard Law School 
and the legal offices of the NAACP.  It was an unlikely campaign that 
drew upon technical mastery, creativity, political and social theory, mul-
tistate mobilizing, and movement financing to entangle multiple legal 
actors in a drama that reached its zenith in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.48  It produced scores of lawyers across the country who had hands-
on experience with using the same legal system that had facilitated 
American Apartheid to dismantle it.  It touched the lives of millions of 
Americans.  It engaged thousands of judges, administrators, and policy-
makers.  It reformed hundreds of institutions.  And in the end, the cam-
paign produced one law professor that Harvard Law School was willing 
to hire: Derrick Bell.  By 1980 when that professor left, the deep pool of 
Black talent that produced the civil rights revolution had apparently 
run dry.49 
While Harvard’s administrators likely anticipated that Bell’s depar-
ture would present institutional challenges given their assessment of the 
talent pool, there was little to suggest that a crisis was brewing about 
the curricular gap that opened in the wake of his departure.  As admin-
istrators admitted to a student delegation that first inquired about Bell’s 
missing course, the school had simply overlooked it.  This oversight sig-
naled at least in part the sense that Bell’s course was valued mainly as 
an exercise of academic freedom rather than as a central undertaking of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 44 Derrick Bell, A Pre-Memorial Message on Law School Teaching, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 205, 208 (1997). 
 45 See William J. Brennan, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 HARV. L. REV. 23, 
36–37 (1991); THURGOOD MARSHALL: SUP. CT. JUST. & C.R. ADVOC., http://thurgoodmarshall. 
com [https://perma.cc/Z2SB-YHPP]. 
 46 See CARTER, supra note 15, at 31–33, 95–96, 146–47, 214–20. 
 47 See A Symposium on Charles Hamilton Houston, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 589, 596–98, 600 
(1993). 
 48 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  For further background, see generally MARK V. TUSHNET, THE 
NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925–1950 (2004 ed.). 
 49 See Abby D. Phillip, Race Sparked HLS Tension: Lack of Faculty Diversity Sparked Boycotts 
at HLS, HARVARD CRIMSON (June 1, 2008), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2008/6/1/race-
sparked-hls-tension-a-battle/ [https://perma.cc/3KXX-5HCL] (“[Dean James] Vorenberg held fast 
to Harvard’s longstanding position that it could not find qualified tenure-track faculty members 
because the pool of such scholars was limited.”). 
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a modern law school.50  That the course may have been regarded as a 
boutique offering was bolstered by the content of the course itself.51  
“Constitutional Law and Minority Issues” diverged from some of the 
standard treatments of law in relation to the race problem.  It was nei-
ther a civil rights “how to” course, nor was it an effort to shoehorn a 
vision of civil rights into the constitutional ecosystem that protected ex-
isting entitlements and values.52 
A symbolic representation of Bell’s theoretical orientation was em-
bodied in the lithograph of Tommie Smith and John Carlos that was 
prominently located in the opening pages of his textbook, Race, Racism, 
and American Law.53  At the 1968 Olympics, Smith and Carlos had 
raised their fists in a Black Power salute during the ceremonial award-
ing of their gold and bronze medals for the 200-meter event.  Their ac-
tions were widely criticized within the mainstream press as an embar-
rassment to the nation.54  Many civil rights leaders distanced themselves 
from the protest actions of these and other athletes of the era.  Whether 
pressed or not, mainstream leaders of the Civil Rights Establishment 
clung to a vision of racial equality that eschewed most symbols or rhe-
torical gestures that drew any link between race and power.55  For Bell, 
however, the image symbolized the analogous point of departure of the 
book.  Bell would run the race by rendering a thorough engagement 
with the relevant law.  But, like Carlos and Smith, he would not subor-
dinate Black interests to the rituals of the national ego.  Thus, through-
out Bell’s treatment of civil rights in his text, the principle issues he 
explored were the doctrinal rules and policy choices that rationalized 
and constituted the racial disempowerment of Black people.56  In this 
sense, Bell’s text diverged significantly from conventional approaches to 
such topics.  Traditional theorizing seemed to require theorists to color 
inside the lines of federalism and existing rights.  But Bell’s view was 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 50 See Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1266 & n.35.  
 51 See id. at 1267 (noting that Dean Vorenberg questioned “what was ‘so special’ about [the] 
course”). 
 52 See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, The First Decade: Critical Reflections, or “A Foot in the 
Closing Door,” 49 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1349 (2002). 
 53 DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW, at vii–viii (6th ed. 2008) (“This 
book is dedicated to all those who throughout America’s history have risked its wrath to protest its 
faults.  Courageous black athletes mounted a famous protest against racism at the 1968 Olympic 
Games.  That protest, like so many that preceded it, constituted a prophecy . . . .”  Id. at vii). 
 54 See, e.g., Muriel Nitzkin, Letter to the Editor, ‘Silent Protest’ at Olympics, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 
23, 1968, at 20 (“[They] show[ed] flagrant disrespect for their country and the competition, . . . [and] 
they have dishonored all Americans — black and white.”).  
 55 See Roy Wilkins, Opinion, The Big Olympic Mistake, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1968, at B7 (dis-
missing the protest as “comparatively mild” and myopic).  
 56 See BELL, supra note 53, at 683 (“This book is concerned primarily with American racism 
initiated by whites against blacks, and it reviews the extent to which racial discrimination is legiti-
mated by the law, as well as many of the efforts to utilize the law to remedy racial bias.”). 
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that these lines themselves constituted the constitutional and legal struc-
ture within which white supremacy was maintained.  Unlike Professor 
Herbert Wechsler and other constitutional giants whose holy grail was 
the elusive neutral principle that could ground racial reform,57 Bell en-
gaged the law in pursuit of the full liberation of African Americans, a 
principle that from his point of view was just as political or neutral as 
any investment in the status quo.58  Bell’s sympathy for the Black Power 
agenda placed his course and his textbook in an ideological camp decid-
edly apart from the civil rights leadership, many of whom were embar-
rassed and repulsed by a new racial justice discourse centered on 
power.59 
By the time the students who would eventually lead the Alternative 
Course arrived at Harvard Law School, Derrick Bell had given notice 
that he would be leaving to take up the Deanship at the University of 
Oregon Law School, citing frustration at the slow pace of change.60  His 
departure left only one other professor of color on the staff,61 and as 
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 57 See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 34 (1959) (questioning the legitimacy of the Brown decision because he could not identify any 
neutral principle that would distinguish between the rights of black school children to associate and 
the rights of white school children not to).  For a compelling critique of the conservative underpin-
nings of Neutral Principles, see Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950’s, 21 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 561 (1988). 
 58 See Derrick Bell, The Law Student as Slave, in THE DERRICK BELL READER 278, 283 
(Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2005) (“It is time to free yourselves, move your law schools 
toward liberation, and thereby increase the chances that you and the lawyers who follow you will 
have the courage as well as the skill to provide this country the leaders we so desperately need — 
leaders for whom the bottom line is not dollars earned but personal integrity and public service.”). 
 59 See YVONNE RYAN, ROY WILKINS: THE QUIET REVOLUTIONARY AND THE NAACP 
168–69 (2014) (“[NAACP Executive Director Roy Wilkins] went on to define in the harshest, most 
uncompromising way his views on Black Power.  ‘No matter how endlessly they try to explain it, 
the term “Black Power” means anti-white power.  In a racially pluralistic society, the concept, the 
formation and the exercise of an ethnically-tagged power means opposition to other ethnic powers, 
just as the term “white supremacy” means subjection of all non-white people.  In the black-white 
relationship, it has to mean that every other ethnic power is the rival and the antagonist of “Black 
Power.”  It has to mean “going-it-alone.”  It has to mean separatism[,]’ . . . [which] offer[s] little to 
the disadvantaged but the chance to ‘shrivel and die. . . . It is a reverse Mississippi, a reverse Hitler, 
a reverse Ku Klux Klan.  Black Power . . . can mean in the end only black death.’” (second and 
third omissions in original)); STEPHEN L. WASBY, RACE RELATIONS LITIGATION IN AN AGE 
OF COMPLEXITY 64 (1995) (“[Director-Counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund Jack]  
Greenberg is said to have shown dislike for staff lawyers who advocated providing legal support to 
‘radicals’ or who themselves seemed to be radical . . . .”); “Black Power” Slogan of Negroes Lam-
basted and Defended, CHI. TRIB., July 27, 1966, at 9 (“The Negroes’ new slogan ‘black power,’ 
was criticized and defended by Negro leaders yesterday . . . . [Dr.] King . . . said the term ‘black 
power’ was unfortunate . . . [and that] a struggle for black supremacy is as evil as white  
supremacy.”). 
 60 See DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY 43 (1994). 
 61 At the time of Bell’s departure from Harvard Law School, the only other Black faculty mem-
ber was Clarence Clyde Ferguson, a 1951 Harvard graduate who had previously served on the 
faculty of Rutgers Law School, as dean of the Howard Law School, and as ambassador to Uganda.  
Id. at 43–44; see also Bell, Credentials, supra note 43, at 472 (“My efforts at Harvard to recruit more 
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previously noted, Bell’s tenured course was simply removed from the 
curriculum.  For students, Bell’s departure left significant gaps to be 
filled in terms of both personnel and curriculum.  The need for more 
professors of color was obvious and urgent, as was the need for Bell’s 
fourteen-week course “Constitutional Law and Minority Issues” on 
treatment of the law and its relationship to racial hierarchy. 
That the Administration did not share the same sense of urgency was 
apparent in the reactions of Dean James Vorenberg to a delegation of 
students who were sent by a consortium of student groups to press for 
the course and for a Black professor to teach it.62  The students made 
the case that the search for someone to teach Bell’s course should more 
broadly identify and recruit scholars of color.63  As they saw it, the in-
sights that would be derived from someone whose experience included 
practicing law as a racialized subject were an important perspective that 
they wanted to engage.64 
Dean Vorenberg framed his response to the students by proffering 
two distinct queries.  The first was to challenge the students to articulate 
what they hoped to learn in the now defunct course, “Constitutional 
Law and Minority Issues.”65  The second was to challenge the students’ 
preference for a Black professor, countering with a hypothetical question 
about whether an excellent white professor wouldn’t be preferable to a 
mediocre Black one.66  The first question was especially challenging be-
cause students would have had to have taken the course to be able to 
fully answer it.  The second was useful as a pithy but deeply revealing 
statement about how the Administration and potentially the wider fac-
ulty that couldn’t be found in the standard constitutional law offering 
and a stint at legal services saw things. 
After Dean Vorenberg set the terms of the contestation about the 
course and demands to hire more minority law professors, the conflict’s 
unfolding uncovered sharply divergent beliefs about what liberal insti-
tutions should be doing to meet the expectations of integration.  Matters 
only escalated when the faculty voted to hire ten white male professors 
that spring.67  The Dean continued to point to the pool problem when 
pressed about the dearth of minority law professors in the class of new 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
blacks with backgrounds similar to mine were stymied by faculty who preferred to wait for appli-
cants with academic credentials like their own, but who just happened to be black.  Blacks with 
high-level academic credentials do exist.”). 
 62 See Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1267. 
 63 Id. at 1266. 
 64 Letter from Irma Tyler Wood to James Vorenberg, Dean, Harvard Law Sch. (Mar. 9, 1982) 
(on file with the Harvard Law School Library).  
 65 Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1267. 
 66 Dave Horn, Third World Coalition Renews Support for Course Boycott, HARV. L. REC., Sept. 
17, 1982, at 1. 
 67 See id. 
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hires.  For students, the all-white hiring episode reinforced their sense 
that the faculty imagined the pool of possible colleagues of color to be 
extremely shallow.  The faculty’s tolerance for a continuing state of gross 
underrepresentation seemed especially formalistic in light of their past 
ability to see and value the qualifications of Derrick Bell.  As for the 
Administration, the evolutionary approach that seemed to students to 
project any significant integration far into the future wasn’t quite the 
distant possibility that the students feared.  Although the Dean had not 
shared this information with them, he had reason to believe that one 
Black candidate would join the faculty within the coming months, and 
others were mulling over their offers.68  Faculty operating with this 
knowledge may well have seen the students’ frustrations as likely to 
settle once the Administration’s efforts to recruit select candidates were 
made public.  In the meantime, however, the Dean announced that a 
new course would be offered in the three-week intersession.69  The 
course would feature two civil rights lawyers, Julius Chambers70 and 
Jack Greenberg, and would cover civil rights litigation.  It was widely 
agreed upon that this offering was a response to student demands for 
Bell’s course to be offered.  What was not widely agreed upon was 
whether this course met the students’ expectations. 
From the students’ perspective, it did not.71  In response, a broad 
coalition of student organizations pooled their resources to launch an 
alternative course that featured a dozen faculty members of color from 
across the country, each of whom visited the law school to teach a unit 
from Bell’s text.  Several Harvard Law School professors associated 
with CLS offered independent study credit for students who enrolled in 
the course and produced written work.72  The Coalition’s decision to 
boycott the Administration’s offering in favor of a student-initiated al-
ternative produced two notable outcomes.  First, it provided an oppor-
tunity for a critical mass of students and young professors to engage 
with each other in parsing and expanding an intellectual critique of ra-
cial liberalism.  The themes and ideas that emerged from this collective 
engagement between students and young professors would eventually 
cohere as a set of texts that would become part of the Critical Race 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 68 See Edley, supra note 42. 
 69 Horn, supra note 66, at 1. 
 70 Julius LeVonne Chambers succeeded Jack Greenberg as the director-counsel of the LDF and 
tried several cases before the Supreme Court, including Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), which dealt with school desegregation, and Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 
U.S. 30 (1986), which focused on minority voting rights, during his legal career.  Julius Levonne 
Chambers In Memoriam, NAACP LDF (Aug. 3, 2013), http://www.naacpldf.org/news/statement- 
passing-former-ldf-president-director-counsel-julius-levonne-chambers [https://perma.cc/T5KV-DRWD]. 
 71 See Third World Coalition Letter (May 24, 1982), in BLACKS AT HARVARD, supra note 43, 
at 457, 457–58 [hereinafter Third World Coalition Letter]. 
 72 See Crenshaw, supra note 3, at 1280. 
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Theory canon.  The Alternative Course also lit a fuse that would explode 
into a national debate.73  Exposing the hidden fault lines that had long 
existed within the civil rights constituency.  While many in the CRE saw 
the students’ protest as an embodiment of black power politics that they 
sought to discredit, the students saw meritocracy as the new lunch coun-
ters in the struggle over law, knowledge, and power. 
The students argued that the law school’s course offered neither an 
approach to recruit more minority law professors to join Harvard’s fac-
ulty, nor a substantive treatment that engaged an array of issues beyond 
the enforcement of civil rights laws.74  On the former question, neither 
instructor filled the role that the students imagined — a candidate will-
ing to join Harvard’s faculty who could teach about race and the law, 
and who would model the skills and critical thinking that “Third World” 
lawyers would likely need.  Neither sought a full time position at  
Harvard, and equally salient for many of the students was the fact that 
Greenberg would not have integrated the faculty even were he to have 
expressed interest in Harvard.75  On the matter of the course, while the 
nuts and bolts of civil rights litigation were obviously useful, the  
Administration’s offering of it as the only replacement for Bell’s class 
appeared to students to substantively dismiss Bell’s broader inquiry into 
the vexed relationship between law and racial power.  This critical ori-
entation toward legal institutions echoed the perspectives of Steel and 
others who had been punished for venturing down this wayward path.  
To students who shared the perspective of Black Law Students  
Association (BLSA) President Muhammad Kenyatta,76 the Administra-
tion’s course seemed to confirm critiques raised by Bell and others about 
who should control the antiracism agenda and whose interests were 
served.  Kenyatta stated bluntly that “[f]or many years the distinction 
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 73 Fox Butterfield, Harvard Law School Torn by Race Issue, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 1990), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/04/26/us/harvard-law-school-torn-by-race-issue.html [https://perma. 
cc/CD25-MZ3R]. 
 74 See Third World Coalition Letter, supra note 71; James Vorenberg Letter (July 21, 1982), in 
BLACKS AT HARVARD, supra note 43, at 459, 459–60 (enclosing the letter written by Muhammad 
Kenyatta — President of the Harvard Black Law Students Association — explaining the organiza-
tion’s intent to boycott the course). 
 75 GREENBERG, supra note 27, at 502–04. 
 76 A critic of racial liberalism, Kenyatta was not a stranger to high-profile agitation, nor the 
threat of repressive consequences.  See Kenyatta v. Moore, 623 F. Supp. 224 (S.D. Miss. 1985) (ad-
dressing Kenyatta’s allegations that the FBI violated his First Amendment rights by surveilling and 
threatening him under their counterintelligence program).  Kenyatta strongly opposed the hiring of 
Greenberg.  The opposition became widely publicized, garnering critiques that Kenyatta opposed 
Greenberg because of his race, an accusation which Kenyatta rejected, claiming that his letter to 
the Dean focused on the lack of black faculty members.  Brando Simeo Starkey, Drastic Action: 
The 1983 Course Boycott at Harvard Law School, 21 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 56, 62–69 (2008); Michel 
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has been blurred between the orthodox liberal agenda and the autono-
mous aspirations of Afro-Americans.”77 
The complicated backstory and varied orientations of the students 
were collapsed into a familiar narrative of Black radicals railing against 
their white allies in news reports and op-eds that followed the Dean’s 
framing of the issue to the student body.78  In a letter to the student 
population, the Dean included a letter from Kenyatta and went on to 
say that “to boycott a course on racial discrimination, because part of it 
is taught by a white lawyer, is wrong in principle and works against, not 
for, shared goals of racial and social justice.”79  The Dean’s letter was 
picked up by the press and in short order a student-led protest over 
curricular offerings and minority recruitment became another flash 
point in the continuing struggles between liberals and radicals that had 
undermined the civil rights movement and threatened its future.  The 
students’ refusal to accept the seminar, laced with a letter from the 
BLSA President with criticism of Greenberg’s role at the helm of an 
African American organization, prompted a swift rebuke from the 
CRE.80  Stalwarts from multiple quarters of the establishment came to 
Harvard’s defense, citing the distinguished careers of the two civil rights 
attorneys and denouncing the students as bigots.  The iconic Bayard 
Rustin81 declared that the protest was “nothing more than blatant rac-
ism.”82  The more moderate Carl T. Rowan83 pronounced the students 
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 77 Muhammad Kenyatta, Letter to the Editor, At Harvard the Course of Civil Rights Doesn’t 
Run Smooth, WALL STREET J., Sept. 13, 1982, at 31. 
 78 Media coverage of the course boycott began in July after Dean Vorenberg mailed a series of 
letters to all returning students.  For a reprinting of his letters and some of the responses by other 
key players, see The Greenberg-Chambers Incident: Harvard Law School, 1982–83, in BLACKS AT 
HARVARD, supra note 43, at 457, 457–67. 
 79 James Vorenberg Letter, supra note 74, at 459–60. 
 80 Martin Kilson, a black Harvard government professor, stated that the “[b]lack students who 
require ethnocentric crutches as part of their academic regime have to start growing up.”  Martin 
Kilson, Ethnic Arrogance at Harvard, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 1982, at A19. 
 81 In addition to organizing the 1963 March on Washington, Rustin worked closely with Martin 
Luther King, Jr., and a number of other leaders, bringing nonviolent protest techniques to the 
movement.  See generally JOHN D’EMILIO, LOST PROPHET: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF BAYARD 
RUSTIN (2004); Devon W. Carbado & Donald Weise, The Civil Rights Identity of Bayard Rustin, 
82 TEX. L. REV. 1133 (2004). 
 82 Bayard Rustin, Letter to the Editor, A Misguided Protest by Blacks at Harvard, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 17, 1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/08/17/opinion/l-a-misguided-protest-by-blacks-at-
harvard-087725.html [https://perma.cc/7QPL-HK6F]. 
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tions in America.  He served as the U.S. Ambassador to Finland, the first Black Deputy Secretary 
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to be “racist, anti-intellectual, [and] anti-civil-rights.”84  Yet beneath the 
assertion of “principle” was a disagreement about the principles that 
should dictate the terms of institutional engagement.  No invocation of 
“shared goals” could justify for the students a state of institutional affairs 
that appeared to differ little from the preceding decades. 
Having been condemned by civil rights elders for essentially biting 
the hands that fed them, student leaders viewed the CRE critics as com-
promised by their embrace of liberal institutional values — values that 
blinded them to the ways in which the earlier generation’s struggles 
against white supremacy on busses and at lunch counters were being 
played out again in law schools and elsewhere in American society.  The 
student critics were dismayed that their critique of the Administration’s 
actions could be written off so effortlessly, particularly in light of the use 
of rationales like “qualifications” and gradualism that civil rights law-
yers had found to stymie meaningful reform elsewhere.85  The fact that 
Harvard Law School administrators and faculty were liberal allies in 
elite spaces no doubt contributed to a willingness to assume good faith 
on their part.  But from the student’s perspective, the issue was never 
one of bad faith.  The problem for the students was the opposite: the 
establishment’s unshakable belief that fidelity to what it viewed as neu-
tral institutional practices was appropriate and fair.86  The foundational 
belief that had long characterized race liberals was that racial disparities 
would eventually fade as people of color were shorn of their particular-
ities and absorbed into race-neutral spaces. 
There had been reason to think that in the context of a new social 
regime, institutions like Harvard might have thoroughly reevaluated the 
content of their curriculum in light of the new communities and values 
they might serve.  After all, as noted above, Harvard was far from a 
bastion of conservative resistance to integration.  It had stepped up its 
recruiting of minority students in the 1970s, and some of its faculty were 
engaged in efforts to bring about social change elsewhere.  The Dean 
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 84 Carl T. Rowan, Harvard Blacks Fail Bias Test, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 15, 
1982, at B-2. 
 85 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (holding that aptitude tests used in 
hiring practices having a disparate impact on ethnic minorities must be reasonably job related).  In 
addition to legal challenges against tests and other measures used to exclude Black applicants from 
access to employment and promotions, civil rights lawyers had reason to be suspicious of the use of 
meritocratic discourse to justify the exclusion of Black teachers.  As Carter explains, Black teachers 
and administrators were sometimes fired en masse in the wake of integration on the grounds that 
they were comparatively unqualified.  CARTER, supra note 15, at 156–57.  Carter notes that these 
arguments were specious, and that sometimes Black educators had acquired credentialization that 
outpaced their white counterparts.  Id. 
 86 See Third World Coalition Letter, supra note 71, at 456–57. 
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himself was on the Executive Committee of the premier civil rights liti-
gation organization, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund.87  Underlying the 
school’s inability to reconsider the source of the pool problem, however, 
was a failure on its part to constructively critique its own everyday prac-
tices and norms.  There was a gold standard that remained in place — 
immune from reassessment — and it translated into an inability to 
reevaluate and rethink those dimensions of law school practice that were 
forged in, and consistent with, unwarranted exclusionary criteria.  From 
the critics’ perspective, there was nothing essential or compelling about 
the “standard” criteria that justified the refusal to consider alternative 
“qualifications.”  This critique included the assertion that knowledge 
gained from the particular experience of being a lawyer of color in post-
apartheid American society could indeed constitute an important con-
sideration.88  From this point of view, race could be a meaningful con-
sideration if solving the “race problem” had been viewed in terms of 
addressing the ways that law in general and legal teaching in particular 
were sites in which racial power was mediated and justified.89 
But addressing underrepresentation in terms of racial power ran 
against the liberal grain of framing discrimination as bias; that is to say, 
a distortion of institutional procedures.  Bias, once identified, could be 
managed through embracing neutral practices — ideally through a 
colorblind prism — rather than normalizing the practice of measuring 
racial progress through substantive benchmarks. 
The tensions between the students and the CRE were also shaped 
by disparate conceptions of what the role of “integrating” students was 
meant to be.  Among the most fundamental commitments of the inte-
grationist vision was the idea that exposing different races to one an-
other would confirm that race was a meaningless social category, a set 
of assumptions that reflected habits of the mind rather than realities 
anchored in the material world.90  To civil rights elders, having fought 
so hard alongside white allies to dislodge beliefs that racial outsiders 
were ill-suited to compete in elite environments, the last thing they 
wanted to hear were demands that those institutions accommodate ra-
cially grounded requests to abandon “neutral” criteria of inclusion.91  
The sense of dismay among the senior generation was palpable.  Not 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 87 Vorenberg, Ninth Dean of Law School, Dies, HARV. GAZETTE (Apr. 20, 2000), h t t p : / / n e w s . 
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KQPB]. 
 88 See Bell, Credentials, supra note 43, at 473 (“The correlation between good grades and aca-
demic success is not so close that the school should reject the students’ suggestion that at least one 
civil rights teacher, in a school with so large a faculty, should have experienced, as well as worked 
to end, racial discrimination.”). 
 89 See Duncan Kennedy, supra note 5, at 718. 
 90 An example of this rhetoric is found in the Supreme Court’s doctrine of using diversity as the 
justification for the use of race-conscious measures in universities.  See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306, 330 (2003). 
 91 See GREENBERG, supra note 27, at 502–04. 
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only had students failed to meet the expectations of the integrationist 
project, but also, in protesting the actions of liberal whites, they had 
disrespected their allies and threatened the principles that were central 
to the multiracial coalition of integrationism.  By contrast, from the stu-
dents’ perspective, if integration was to be meaningful at all, it could 
not be realized by simply assimilating into institutions shaped by the 
very practices that had rationalized the exclusion of people of color in 
the past.  Moreover, race consciousness in recruiting faculty as well as 
students was not an evil that needed to be suppressed.  It was instead a 
basis for transforming institutions and for identifying and serving his-
torically constituted communities. 
The ideological conflict between race liberals and those who sympa-
thized with a more radical tradition, then, revealed that the way that 
race and racism were conceptualized was linked to how practices that 
reproduce the status quo are perceived.  To the students, Harvard’s re-
sponse to the curricular and faculty deficiencies that prompted the con-
troversy helped to clarify that what counted as qualified and what view-
points about race and law were valued had been built on established 
practices from the past.  The claim that they were neutral and necessary 
obscured the fact that reliance on such criteria reflected unwarranted 
policy choices rather than institutional necessities.  By contrast, to ad-
ministrators and faculty, what the students saw as institutional deficits 
were simply opportunities waiting to be filled with the right kind of 
candidate. 
Beyond the internal defenses of the curricular and hiring practices, 
students were stunned that their CRE critics failed to see, much less 
interrogate, how the same baselines that were used to frame the students 
as “biased” were also operating to frame other race-conscious policies as 
reverse discrimination across the societal terrain.92  
III.  CONCLUSION: THE RISE OF CRITICAL RACE THEORY 
The generation of students and young professors who entered elite 
law schools during the post–civil rights era found scant intellectual 
space within these institutions to interrogate the implications of the civil 
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 92 Harvard’s relatively aggressive recruitment of minority students was not matched by a simi-
lar commitment to recruit faculty, leading student protestors to note that if Regents of the University 
of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), justified using race as a factor in admissions, then surely 
Harvard could consider race as a factor in employment.  See, e.g., Donald Christopher Tyler & 
Cynthia Muldrow, Letter to the Editor, Goal of a Boycott at Harvard Law, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 
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rights retrenchment that was unfolding across society.93  Set in the con-
text of the retreating project of racial reform, the pitched institutional 
struggle at Harvard Law School over curricular offerings and faculty 
hiring marked ideological tensions within the civil rights constituency.  
The unexpected fracture within the CRE that underwrote the conflict 
was matched by an equally unexpected convergence between students 
and faculty of color and the largely white, newly situated left-leaning 
theorists who constituted CLS.94  The CLS approach to law was irrev-
erent, critical of both the rule of law and faith in rights-based reform.  
It was committed to demystifying the ways that legal ideology worked 
to generate consent to conditions of inequality.95 
As the insights around institutional struggles in law schools across 
the country brought out the limitations of the prevailing dialogues, crit-
ical thinkers took up a more sustained project of examining doctrinal 
discourses that replicated the naturalization of racial power the contro-
versy had revealed.  Responding to rollbacks of race-conscious policies 
and the narrowed scope of equal protection doctrine, critical race theo-
rists developed an alternative line of argumentation.  Influenced in 
many ways by its early associations with CLS, CRT emphasized the 
ways that legal rules continued to facilitate the social construction of 
race, not simply as a long-term consequence of past segregation, but 
through rules that helped constitute racial interests and that continued 
to insulate them from both judicially and legislatively mandated  
redistribution.96 
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 93 The rise of neoconservativism in the 1970s and 1980s called for the end of affirmative action, 
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Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 12 
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 95 See Duncan Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in LEFT LEGAL-
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deepened a sense of how the more significant struggles were not simply about the permissible scope 
of any potential remedy, but about the baselines from which particular social conditions would be 
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Although Harvard Law School celebrates its bicentennial thirty-
seven years after Professor Derrick Bell’s departure to Oregon, the need 
for reform and the critical orientation in legal education that he embod-
ied remains as salient as ever.  Indeed, just in 2016, Harvard Law stu-
dent activists called on the school to a create a Critical Race Theory 
program to help contextualize the school’s curriculum, describing their 
efforts as “intellectually descended from the numerous student move-
ments that have arisen time and again at Harvard Law School.”97  Like 
the struggles at Harvard in the 1980s, today’s student activism must be 
read as a chapter in the ongoing conflict between the liberal center and 
the critical left on how to conceptualize the contemporary implications 
of American Apartheid.  From yesterday’s contestations over the ideals 
of colorblind meritocracy to today’s interment of the short and bitter-
sweet romance with post-racialism, race liberals and their radical critics 
have struggled over the terms of engagement with legal institutions and 
their role in reproducing racial hierarchy.  Understandably, these histor-
ical conflicts may seem to offer little analytic value in the face of the 
seismic shift to the right on race matters, evidenced from Charlottesville 
to the White House.  The resurrection of pre–civil rights discourse in 
today’s post- post-racial America may underwrite the assumption that 
the historic tensions between centrist liberals and race radicals are ut-
terly irrelevant in understanding this moment.  But ideological struggles 
over how social power is framed and contested in one era do not simply 
fade away with the rightward shifts and ideological reboots in the next.  
To the contrary, these histories track how ideological conflicts over the 
scope of racial reform were resolved in ways that depoliticized the revolt 
against racial power in American institutions, further entrenching de-
fenses that naturalize the racial status quo.  
The story of race, reform, and retrenchment is an endlessly renew-
able narrative in American history, one in which legal discourse has 
played a recurring starring role.98  This enduring problem calls for a 
rigorous examination of the law and its role in reproducing racial hier-
archy.  Not only is this critical project far from obsolete within liberal 
institutions, the continuing saga of race and racism in American society 
underscores the need for it.   
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framed as either natural or illegitimately imposed.  For Critical Race Theorists, the move to inter-
rogate baselines opened up a wider template from which to challenge the relationship between law 
and racial power.  It also extended the critique of race liberalism to a set of policies that now con-
stitute its post-racial successor. 
 97 Claire E. Parker, Law School Activists Occupy Student Center, HARV. CRIMSON (Feb. 17, 
2016, 9:43 PM), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2016/2/17/activists-occupy-wasserstein/ [https:// 
perma.cc/HP6J-M4RM]. 
 98 See id. (noting a student’s discontent that “the Law School’s current curriculum often ap-
proaches law as if it were created in a vacuum without regard to its implications for minorities”). 
